98 「漫长的十九世纪」和被它淹没的人们

www.xiaoyuzhoufm.com1:14:54Chinese

Left Right takes The Emperor Waltz as a starting point for a discussion of the long nineteenth century: believing humanity will make progress in the long run doesn’t mean life is bound to get better in the near term.

Overview

98 「漫长的十九世纪」和被它淹没的人们

Key points

  • Gao Lin defines the cultural ‘long nineteenth century’ as the period from the French Revolution to World War I. He considers 1914 a convenient dividing line, but argues that the old political rules didn’t truly disappear until several countries changed leaders in succession in 1916.
  • Emperors are worth writing about not because they are inherently more important than ordinary people, but because their choices and attitudes are exceptionally well documented. Ordinary people would be just as valuable to study if the record of their lives were equally rich.
  • What later generations call the Belle Époque was riddled with problems in the articles and diaries of many who lived through it. They expected science and technology to solve those problems, but Gao Lin cautions that long-term progress tells us nothing about whether life will get better this year or next.
  • Gao Lin places Voltaire’s tolerance and satire in the context of religious persecution. He distinguishes between Voltaire’s use of laughter to challenge ignorance and the later elevation of reason into a lofty ideal that some people felt entitled to impose by force.
  • French salons once helped those in power win allies who could shape public opinion. By the late nineteenth century, newspapers and the publishing market gave writers more independence, and literary prizes and informal groups formed by writers gradually took over some of the salons’ roles.
  • Talleyrand is remembered for his personal achievements, yet in his lifetime he was intent on proving that he descended from the Périgord family. Gao Lin uses this contrast to show how people in the nineteenth century were pulled by both old ideas about birth and newer ideas about making one’s own way.
  • Gao Lin uses Wilhelm II’s naval policy to show that explaining history solely through the emperor’s character leaves out the division of power between the empire and its states, funding, and the army’s reliance on aristocratic officers. But he also objects to writing individuals out of history altogether.

Chapter notes

Opening and the origins of The Emperor Waltz

  • After Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in 1914, Zweig, who was in Belgium, was convinced that Germany and Austria-Hungary wouldn’t go to war over a single assassination and that even if they did, they wouldn’t invade neutral Belgium. Only when he caught the last train back to Germany and saw a train on the opposite track carrying German troops about to invade Belgium did he realize the world wasn’t as he had imagined it.
  • The Goncourt brothers resented being seen as aristocratic dabblers while Maupassant was hailed as a great writer. The episode sees that resentment as setting the tone for the Prix Goncourt: to support new writers the market hadn’t recognized so they could write without worrying about making a living. The episode also puts the true end of the nineteenth century in 1916: Franz Joseph died, Germany’s Falkenhayn was replaced by Ludendorff and others, and in Britain Edward Grey and Asquith resigned and Lloyd George took charge. These changes marked the passing of one era into another.
  • Gao Lin says his greatest pleasure is chatting about whatever comes to mind, and that he writes books and articles with no particular practical purpose in mind. For him, the greatest function of history, culture, and art is to satisfy curiosity. The Emperor Waltz draws on a series of articles he previously published on a WeChat public account and on Zhihu, with most of the material coming from Young Vienna.
  • Gao Lin calls today’s Young Vienna ‘a little literary gang with no organization or discipline,’ much like the historical literary circle also known as the Young Vienna school. The Berlin Modernists once sent a representative to Vienna to discuss an alliance. The representative got along with everyone, but as soon as he brought up a joint manifesto, they asked what they needed an organization for. Gao Lin likewise thinks that even if something serves no practical purpose, it’s worth having around as long as it’s fun.
  • Gao Lin originally wanted to call the book Chit-Chat Polka. When people objected, he joked that he could translate it as Inside Information Polka instead, which would make it sound like a book about economics. He ultimately chose The Emperor Waltz, which was his ringtone at the time. The title he picked by chance turned out to fit: the book covers many figures from the turn of the nineteenth century and devotes considerable space to emperors with distinctive personalities, including Napoleon III and Wilhelm II.

Why write about the long nineteenth century?

  • The Emperor Waltz may look like a loosely organized collection of essays, but one theme runs through it: the cultural ‘long nineteenth century,’ the hundred-plus years from the French Revolution to World War I.
  • One reason the nineteenth century is so fascinating is that it was a time of upheaval, when people began to think about their own fates and even those of several generations in terms of centuries. At the turn of 1800 to 1801, people weren’t arguing about which century they were in. By the turn of 1900 to 1901, all of Europe was debating when the twentieth century began. Musset’s protagonist, born in the Napoleonic era, likewise saw himself as part of a generation destined to be swallowed up by the nineteenth century.
  • By the twenty-first century, a century was no longer a fine enough measure to distinguish people’s fates. Instead, people began talking about the different experiences of those born in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Gao Lin sees this as a sign that the pace of history keeps accelerating.
  • To explain Wilhelm II’s unusual behavior during the July Crisis, earlier researchers started with his atrophied arm, impaired hearing, and painful childhood treatments, taking his anxiety, feelings of inferiority, and anger as clues to his behavior.
  • The Heavy Crown reflects a contemporary approach that downplays individuals, but nineteenth-century historians cared about the relationship between individuals and history, leaving behind minutely detailed records of emperors and others. Metternich, Talleyrand, and Napoleon III belonged to different periods, and the record of what they did, chose, and believed helps us see the people of that century more clearly. The lives of ordinary people would be just as valuable if they were documented in equal detail.
  • The five-book emperor series is really about the people of the nineteenth century, not rulers, generals, and ministers in their own right. Another fascinating thing about the century is that people at the time didn’t think they were living in an especially wonderful age, while later generations look back fondly on the Victorian era, the French Belle Époque, the German Gilded Age, and Vienna’s golden age.

Why the Belle Époque misread the future

  • In articles and diaries from the Belle Époque, many people were angry about society’s darker side and its failings, but trusted that science and technology would solve those problems in the twentieth century. Looking back, the century they looked forward to saw two world wars and the Cold War, and the shadow of nuclear war didn’t lift from Europe until the century was nearly over.
  • Someone who starts the year thinking about moving house or replacing their car may hear in January that something has gone wrong and still assume it won’t affect their life. It was much the same for Zweig when he learned of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination on June 28, 1914. He was convinced that ‘civilized countries’ like Germany and Austria-Hungary wouldn’t go to war over an assassination, let alone invade neutral Belgium. It wasn’t until he caught the last train back to Germany and saw German soldiers on the opposite track on their way to invade Belgium that he realized the civilization he’d thought so secure wasn’t that solid after all.
  • Someone from Tsinghua working in finance in Beijing once declared that U.S.–China relations could get only so good or so bad. In less than three years, that certainty became an example of what it’s like to be caught in the fog of history. Looking back, the achievements of civilization can be destroyed by barbarism, republics can turn into empires, and progress can be reversed.
  • Over two thousand years, it’s possible to believe that human society has generally progressed. Even looking at just a hundred years, Europeans in the late nineteenth century would have struggled to imagine that two people in China would one day connect over the internet to discuss their era. But a long-term trend like that doesn’t tell us whether life will get better this year or next.
  • Believing in long-term progress and relying on experience in daily life aren’t at odds. You can’t decide whether to take out a 25-year or a 30-year loan on the basis of optimism about the next thousand years. Nor does believing that humanity will eventually be liberated mean you can stop balancing your income and expenses.

Voltaire’s tolerance and laughter

  • Gao Ling puts Voltaire in the first chapter because he represents the eighteenth century that the nineteenth century culturally displaced. The backdrop to this transition was the long period of religious warfare after the Reformation of 1517. According to the speaker, Germany lost more than half its population in the Thirty Years’ War.
  • The speaker questions whether ‘whose realm, his religion’ should count as progress: if subjects didn’t share their king’s faith, their only options were to leave the country or face death. The atrocities committed in the name of faith and lofty ideals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries helped shape the eighteenth century’s tolerance, skepticism, and wariness of the sublime.
  • Voltaire mocked what he saw as hypocrisy but rarely attacked Protestantism. Louis XIV had revoked the freedom of worship for French Protestants that Henry IV had recognized, so Voltaire’s criticism of Catholicism was a defense of religious freedom, not a call to turn around and persecute Catholics. His campaign on behalf of an innocent man who had been killed earned him an enthusiastic welcome from the people of Paris, reflecting their desire to stop killing people for supposedly noble reasons.
  • Voltaire believed reason could rid the world of ignorance, despotism, and barbarism. The generation he influenced went further, wanting to spread reason throughout the world. In the speaker’s view, between 1648 and 1789 Europe came once again to treat a lofty ideal, this time reason, as something worth killing for. By the time of the French Revolution, being ‘irrational’ practically meant you ‘deserved to die.’
  • Voltaire himself didn’t go that far. He stood by tolerance and used satire, biting wit, and roars of laughter to expose ignorance. The speaker contrasts this with Baudelaire’s quotation of Saint Jerome, ‘The wise man laughs only when he trembles,’ noting that Voltaire used this very act, neither pious nor sublime, to show how ridiculous things that passed themselves off as sublime could be.
  • Voltaire’s short maxims would still readily attract readers online today, and the speaker thinks the same is true of Oscar Wilde. That kind of quick wit suited the rules of French salons at the time: no one would wait through a long speech, so you had to win over the room in a single sentence. The speaker recommends the film Ridicule because it shows more vividly than many books how someone could make a name in a salon with just one line.

From salon politics to the publishing market

  • Under the Directory, salons helped people like Napoleon and Joséphine open doors in politics. Under the Consulate after 1801, the way salons worked didn’t fundamentally change, and they carried on the social and political traditions of the eighteenth century.
  • The main speaker sees the Restoration-era Romantics as a force that helped the Bourbon monarchy win public support. Charles Nodier, who went from revolutionary to monarchist, had a major influence on writers like Hugo and Musset through his salon. There was a contrast in literary circles at the time: people who favored democracy in politics defended the three dramatic unities, while royalists wanted to break literary conventions.
  • As late as the Second Empire, Princess Mathilde’s salon could still win allies for the government among those who shaped public opinion. She could even help people she admired gain entry to the Académie française, so they wouldn’t have to worry about making a living.
  • By the Third Republic, salons in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna were all losing influence, and by the late nineteenth century few literary movements were based in a particular salon. Zola and others still met regularly, but not through a salon. Young Vienna met in cafés.
  • Britain already had enough book buyers to support a number of writers in the eighteenth century. France didn’t develop a mass reading market until the mid-nineteenth century, and even then it relied heavily on newspapers. Newspapers paid more than an unknown author could make by publishing a book. Once writers became well known, they could turn the tables and choose their publishers. Maupassant once showed his publisher the numbers, pointing out that another contract would earn him another five or six hundred francs.
  • Alexandre Dumas found that writing for newspaper serialization paid faster than writing plays, so he switched to serialized novels. This shows how the publishing market gave writers a way to make a living without salons. The Prix Goncourt, meanwhile, tried to give new writers who hadn’t found recognition in the market a chance to write without worrying about food or clothing. Prizes that writers set up themselves and groups they formed on their own gradually took the place of salons.

Diplomats caught between two worlds

  • Under a decree of the French king, nobles could inherit the property and surnames of other nobles related to them by blood, but had to put their original surname first. So in the full name Talleyrand-Périgord, Talleyrand came first but was actually the less prestigious name. He insisted that he was the direct heir of the Périgord family, which had once been able to stand on equal terms with the king of France, and paid a scholar to write a History of the Talleyrand-Périgord Family to prove it.
  • Talleyrand was sent into the clergy as a child because of a disability. He went on to make lasting contributions to France and Europe through his own efforts, yet posterity remembers him by the very surname he wanted to shed: Talleyrand. Even after making his name, he was intent on proving his aristocratic ancestry. The contradiction captures the anxiety of some nineteenth-century people caught between personal achievement and inherited status, having lost the past without being able to see the future.
  • Talleyrand missed the eighteenth century he had experienced as a young aristocrat: graceful conversation, dancing, jokes, and witty sayings, pleasures not everyone could enjoy. The younger Metternich also liked life under the old regime, but wasn’t averse to the future. He regretted being born in the nineteenth century: a hundred years earlier, he could have enjoyed eighteenth-century life in peace, and a hundred years later, he could have seen the twentieth century.
  • Talleyrand’s and Metternich’s diplomatic styles are seen as products of the Napoleonic era and the era of the Congress of Vienna. Talleyrand died in 1838, while Metternich lived through the Revolution of 1848 and was often remembered afterward for fleeing in disguise. The conversation links that humiliating episode to accelerating social change and the older generation of statesmen’s unfamiliarity with the new rules.
  • In a representative democracy, voters don’t have time to oversee the government themselves, so they elect members of parliament to do it for them. Honesty thus becomes a basic requirement, since otherwise representatives might abuse the powers voters have given them to line their own pockets. In the age of mass democracy that began in the late nineteenth century, politicians have had to do more than face moral judgment: they’ve had to cultivate an image of moral character.
  • Metternich was able to bring together the Russian tsar, the Austrian emperor, the Prussian king, and the British foreign secretary, reducing diplomacy to negotiations among a handful of monarchs and ministers. That was possible because monarchs held political power. Under those rules, Talleyrand and Metternich didn’t have to care what the public thought of their morals. They only needed to persuade their monarchs that they could get things done.

The professionalization of the military and the end of an era

  • From the eighteenth century into the early nineteenth, light cavalry officers were still seen as sociable men who liked to chase girls. In Pride and Prejudice, the younger sister elopes with a cavalry officer. After the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, especially after 1870, the stereotypical German or Austrian soldier became stiff and unsmiling, a change linked to the rising status of the General Staff.
  • It’s hindsight to see the Prussian General Staff as an innovation whose foresight was apparent from the beginning of the reforms. From the 1830s and 1840s into the 1850s, it gave educated officers without property a way forward. Roon and the elder Moltke are examples: they couldn’t afford to become cavalry officers, who had to buy and keep their horses at their own expense.
  • Commanding a Guards regiment made it easier to rise to general, but the commander had to pay out of pocket for balls where young officers could socialize and find spouses. Officers of modest means therefore preferred to stay on the General Staff. Staff rides and surveying for maps were initially just ways to give them something to do, but proved important in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars.
  • In the Franco-Prussian War, rapid mobilization and railway scheduling allowed Prussia to put a much stronger army than France’s into the field quickly. The discussion attributes that advantage to the mathematics behind railway scheduling. Schlieffen succeeded Waldersee, who was skilled at socializing at court, and spent much of his later life calculating marching routes and road widths in the Netherlands and Belgium. This illustrates the shift from socially adept officers to technically minded staff officers.
  • The outbreak of the war in 1914 can serve as the dividing line for the long nineteenth century, but the two argue that the old rules of the game held for another two years of fighting and only truly ended in 1916. That year, Franz Joseph died, Falkenhayn and others in Germany were replaced by Ludendorff and others, Edward Grey and Asquith resigned in Britain, and Lloyd George succeeded Asquith.
  • Wearing military uniforms didn’t become common among monarchs until the late nineteenth century. Of more than twenty rulers of German states, the Duke of Saxe-Altenburg was the only one who insisted on not wearing one. It wasn’t until around three weeks after the empire ended in 1918 that he learned all the other monarchs had abdicated. Once someone pointed this out to him, he agreed to abdicate too, becoming the last ruler of a German state to do so.

Bonapartism and the Kaiser’s institutional predicament

  • Bonapartism originally meant imperial power based on a popular mandate and a European order led by a progressive France and founded on national independence. What people mainly remember now, though, is Napoleon III’s logic for keeping the Second Empire in power: he didn’t need any class to back him unconditionally as long as the vast majority of society didn’t oppose the regime.
  • Napoleon III balanced competing interests at home to keep his opponents from uniting. He supported Italian unification to satisfy the republicans, but preserved the Papal States and kept French troops there until 1870 to avoid angering royalists and Catholic forces. He treated domestic and foreign policy as bargaining chips, using gains in one to offset concessions in the other and win budget votes in the Legislative Body and voter support in plebiscites.
  • Bismarck came to power because the military budget couldn’t pass in 1862. He then used the war with Denmark and the Austro-Prussian War to establish Prussia’s place in the process of German unification, and used the army’s victories to persuade parliament to retroactively approve the budgets going back to 1862. Gao Lin sees this as following the same logic as Napoleon III’s use of foreign-policy successes to win support at home.
  • Gao Lin argues that Wilhelm II expanded the navy not out of personal irrationality, but as a way to win cross-party support within the imperial system Bismarck had left behind. The armies belonged to the individual states, but the navy belonged to Germany, and imperial legislators were more willing to fund the latter. Shipbuilding also supported industries like arms manufacturing, marine engineering, and mining, along with jobs, so even the Social Democrats didn’t oppose it.
  • Expanding the Prussian army required not only personnel, equipment, and funding, but also enough Junker aristocrats to serve as officers. Ludendorff proposed adding 16 corps, but the younger Moltke and Heeringen ultimately proposed only three because there weren’t enough young aristocrats to command the new units. Under that system, the navy’s funding and steel couldn’t simply be redirected to expand the army.
  • Gao Lin thus attributes naval expansion to the imperial system Bismarck designed rather than to a personal mistake by Wilhelm II. Yet the BBC’s 37 Days still depicts Wilhelm II as an arrogant, ignorant Prussian military boss, and its account of the outbreak of World War I and the July Crisis still follows the British view of the 1920s.

What if Wilhelm II had been in a different position?

  • Popular culture makes Wilhelm II into a figure of fun and often uses a Freudian account of his childhood to link his role in bringing about a world war to his difficult birth and his mother’s attitude toward him. But that account doesn’t necessarily fit the historical facts. Focusing solely on individuals or erasing them altogether isn’t objective enough. Bringing individuals and institutions together makes for a more convincing account, but it can easily lose some of its drama.
  • Writing Bismarck as a heaven-sent great man, Wilhelm II as a fool, and Napoleon III as a buffoon produces the black-and-white, Shakespearean history the public prefers. What If the Kaiser Were the Tsar? has Wilhelm II and his older cousin swap thrones, asking how much of Wilhelm’s urge to perform came from the office of German emperor.
  • The constitution originally provided only for a president of the German federation. The title of emperor was later conferred on the president personally, giving him ceremonial and diplomatic precedence when representing Germany without making him the holder of German sovereignty. Wilhelm I was already elderly and didn’t mind, but Wilhelm II initially thought the German imperial crown and the Prussian royal crown were the same thing.
  • Wilhelm II wrote ‘The emperor’s will is law’ in the guest book at Munich City Hall. The Bavarian government immediately protested, asking if he wanted to annex Bavaria. In Brandenburg, he instead spoke in his capacity as margrave, only to be mocked by newspapers across the empire. He came under fire whether he called himself emperor or margrave, exposing the bind he was in.
  • If Wilhelm II had taken a hereditary throne that had existed for centuries and whose authority went unquestioned, he might have stopped trying so hard to put on a show, finally feeling that he was a monarch by divine right. Or he might have thrown himself even more fully into playing the tsar. He might even have seen himself as Peter the Great reborn and pushed Russia further toward European ways, for instance by introducing English at court.
  • If he had come under attack, been sidelined, or even been put under house arrest in Russia, Wilhelm II might have played the ideal tsar of the peasants’ imagination, suffering alongside his people and weeping in repentance, like ‘Father Gapon with a crown.’ The discussion ends by comparing the German Second Empire with the structure the Meiji Constitution left to imperial Japan. Both contained structural contradictions, so individual fates can’t be explained by personality alone.

Comparing constitutions and appreciating the present

  • Saying that ‘the Meiji Constitution copied Germany’ can easily confuse two constitutional lineages. One runs from the Prussian constitution granted by the king in 1849 through its later amendments. The other runs from the 1867 constitution of the North German Confederation through the changes that produced the 1870 German imperial constitution. The Meiji Constitution drew on the amended Prussian constitution, not the German imperial constitution.
  • The conversation compares the collapse of the two systems. The German imperial system went from entering the war in 1914 to falling apart in 1918. The Prussian-style system Japan inherited collapsed in the course of Japan entering the war in 1941 and ultimately losing it.
  • The Meiji Constitution followed the Prussian constitution in granting real powers to the monarch, but in practice the emperor didn’t take part in decision-making, or at least appeared to steer clear of it. The explanation offered in the conversation is that the framers dared to vest power in the emperor precisely because they could control him.
  • People who lived through the prewar Belle Époque didn’t think it was all that wonderful, and just like people today, they hoped the future would be better. But the warning the nineteenth century leaves us with is that the future might also be worse. Rather than pinning all our hopes on it, we could pay attention to and appreciate the good things we can still experience now.

What it answers

When exactly did the ‘long nineteenth century’ begin and end?
Gao Lin uses it for the hundred-plus years from the French Revolution to World War I. He thinks 1914 works as a dividing line, but it wasn’t until 1916, with the death of Franz Joseph and successive leadership changes in Germany and Britain, that the change of era truly became apparent.
Why does a book about the people of the nineteenth century, not just rulers, generals, and ministers, feature so many emperors?
Because emperors were always in the historical spotlight, leaving behind extensive records of their choices, actions, and attitudes. Gao Lin says ordinary people would be just as worth writing about if they were documented in such detail.
Why didn’t salons continue to dominate literary life in the late nineteenth century?
Newspapers and publishing houses gave writers more ways to earn money and more options. Once writers had made a name for themselves, they could even turn the tables and choose their publishers. Café gatherings, writers’ groups, and literary prizes also gradually took over some of the functions salons had served.
Why doesn’t Gao Lin simply blame Wilhelm II for Germany’s naval expansion?
In his account, the navy belonged to the empire, making it easier to win the imperial parliament’s support than for the armies of the individual states. The expansion of the Prussian army was also limited by the number of aristocratic officers. Naval policy thus reflected the limited choices the imperial system left the emperor.
Does belief in long-term progress conflict with being cautious about life in the near term?
Gao Lin doesn’t think so. You can believe humanity will progress over a century or a millennium, but when making judgments about life right now, the length of a loan, or your income and expenses, you should still rely on experience rather than treat a long-term trend as a short-term guarantee.

Quotes

但我觉得就是没有用的东西,只要有乐趣,它就有自己存在的价值。

But I think even something that’s useless is worth having around as long as it’s fun.

这就意味着一个皇帝就是一个站在历史的聚光灯底下的人。

That means an emperor is someone who stands in the spotlight of history.

并不因为人类迟早要解放,我就可以放弃收支平衡。

Just because humanity will be liberated sooner or later doesn’t mean I can stop balancing my income and expenses.

可惜我生活在十九世纪,我既失去了过去,也看不到未来。

Unfortunately, I live in the nineteenth century. I’ve lost the past, and I can’t see the future.

但是你发现了吗?就是一旦客观,一旦我们觉得它有说服力,它就缺乏戏剧性了。

But have you noticed? The moment it becomes objective, the moment we find it convincing, it loses its drama.

Mentioned

  • 《忽左忽右》 — A podcast hosted by Chen Songrong. This episode focuses on Gao Lin’s book and nineteenth-century Europe.
  • 陈崧嵘 — The host of this episode, who asks Gao Lin about The Emperor Waltz.
  • 高林 — The guest on this episode and author of The Emperor Waltz, who uses stories about individuals to discuss nineteenth-century cultural and institutional change.
  • 《皇帝圆舞曲》 — Gao Lin’s essay collection, centered on the cultural long nineteenth century.
  • 青年维也纳 — The name of both a historical Viennese literary circle and Gao Lin’s own loosely organized group of writers.
  • 茨威格 — The episode uses the story of his disbelief that Germany would invade neutral Belgium to show how people’s confidence in a civilized order came undone.
  • 伏尔泰 — Gao Lin uses him to represent the Enlightenment before the nineteenth century, emphasizing how he used satire to oppose religious persecution.
  • 塔列朗 — Remembered for his personal achievements, he prized his identity as a member of the Périgord family, making him the episode’s example of someone caught between old and new values.
  • 梅特涅 — A diplomat who missed the eighteenth century but was curious about the twentieth. Gao Lin uses his meetings of monarchs to show how old-style European diplomacy worked.
  • 威廉二世 — The episode uses the Kaiser’s naval policy and the powers of his office to discuss how institutions constrain individual choices and shape how people behave.
  • 波拿巴主义 — Gao Lin discusses its original meaning of imperial power conferred by the people, and also uses it to sum up Napoleon III’s way of governing by dividing his opponents and juggling competing interests.
  • 明治宪法 — Used for an institutional comparison at the end of the episode. Gao Lin stresses that it drew on the Prussian constitution, not the German imperial constitution.